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//2A-5/25/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3396 
COUNTY OF ULSTER, 
Employer. 
NANCY HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JOSEPH E. O'DONNELL, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Petitioner 
JOSEPH T. KELLY, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO (CSEA) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) which conditionally 
dismissed a certification petition filed by CSEA for 
representation of a unit of currently unrepresented part-
time-i/ custodial workers employed by the County of Ulster 
(County) at the Ulster County Community College (College). 
The Director found that a unit of part-time custodial workers 
at the College was not the most appropriate unit, and that 
the most appropriate unit would consist of ail part-time 
-i/part-time employees are those who work less than 2 0 
hours per week. 
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employees of the County,-2/ excluding adjunct faculty and all 
other employees. 
As the Director has stated, "It is the policy of the Act 
to find appropriate the largest unit permitting for effective 
negotiations i"-3-/ We are persuaded that the Director 
correctly found that a County-wide unit for part-time 
employees is the most appropriate unit, based upon 
consideration of the community of interest shared by such 
part-time employees with respect to their hours of work, 
exclusion from supplementary benefits and the application of 
common personnel practices and pay rates to them. We also 
agree with the Director that the appropriateness of a County-
wide unit of part-time employees is supported by the 
existence of a County-wide unit of full-time, blue-collar, 
white-collar and administrative noninstructional personnel 
which includes College personnel. Based upon the foregoing, 
the decision of the Director is affirmed, and IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the most appropriate unit of the County's part-
time employees is as follows: 
Included: All employees of the County who 
work less than 2 0 hours per week. 
Excluded: Adjunct faculty and all other 
employees. 
•2/None of the County's part-time employees are currently 
represented. 
37Town of North Castle, 19 PERB 1(4049, at 4071 (1986) . 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless CSEA submits to the 
Director, within 30 days of receipt of this decision and 
order, supplemental evidence sufficient to establish a 30% 
showing of interest among the employees in said unit as of 
the payroll date immediately preceding the date of this 
decision, the petition is dismissed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if such 3 0% showing of 
interest is submitted, an election by secret ballot shall be 
held under the Director's supervision among the employees in 
the above unit, unless CSEA submits evidence within the time 
period described above sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of §201.9(g)(1) of the Board's Rules of Procedure for 
certification without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the County shall submit to 
the Director and to CSEA, within 30 days of receipt of this 
decision and order, an alphabetized list of all employees 
within said unit on the payroll date immediately preceding 
the date of this decision. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2B-5/25/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Petition of 
RITA WALLACE, 
Petitioner CASE NO. 1-003 6 
To review-the-implementation of iocal 
government provisions and procedures 
pursuant to §212 of the Civil 
Service Law and PERB Rule §203.8. 
RICHARD M. GABA, ESQ., for Petitioner 
JACK D. TILLEM, ESQ., for the Nassau County Public 
Employment Relations Board 
BEE, DE ANGELIS & EISMAN, ESQS. (PETER A. BEE, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the County of Nassau 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 30, 1988, Rita Wallace, President of the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Local 83 0, AFSCME Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA), filed a petition with this Board to 
review the implementation of the provisions and procedures of 
the Nassau County Public Employment Relations Board (local 
board) pursuant to §203.8 of this Board's Rules of Procedure. 
The petition alleges that a decision of the local board in a 
representation proceeding does not follow this Board's 
decisions and, therefore, that the continuing implementation 
of the provisions and procedures of the iocal board are not 
substantially equivalent to those in Article 14 of the Civil 
Service Law and PERB's Rules of Procedure. CSEA does not 
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make any claim of procedural unfairness or irregularity 
during the proceedings before the local board. 
The questions raised by the petition have been 
investigated pursuant to §203.8 of our Rules of Procedure. 
CSEA's -claim is based-upon a decision of the local board 
dated November 1, 1988, which affirmed a local hearing 
officer's report and recommendation dated June 10, 1988, 
which denied CSEA's petition to fragment the deputy sheriffs 
and correction officers from CSEA's existing county-wide 
unit. CSEA sought to place these employees in a separate 
unit which it would also represent. 
Hearings were held before Jack D. Tillem, Esq., on 
July 31 and December 8, 1987. CSEA and the employer, Nassau 
County (County), were each represented by counsel at the 
hearings. In support of its petition, CSEA has submitted 
copies of the representation petition, the local hearing 
officer's report and recommendation and the local board's 
decision and order. The County has intervened pursuant to 
§203.8(e) of this Board's Rules, although, as it did 
throughout the proceedings before the local board, it takes 
no position with respect to the merits of CSEA's 
representation petition. The local board has submitted a 
letter in response to the petition for review requesting that 
the petition be dismissed. 
Board - 1-0036 
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DISCUSSION 
It is appropriate to begin our discussion with a 
restatement of the narrowness of our inquiry. In reviewing a 
local board's decision pursuant to §203.8 of our Rules of 
Procedure, we have of ten-recognized the desirability of 
permitting diversity of judgment among local boards.-1/ To 
that end, PERB will not substitute its judgment for that of 
the local board with regard to the merits of the matter under 
review-^/ nor will we reevaluate the weight of the record 
evidence.-2/ Where the local board conducts an adequate 
investigation and properly applies the uniting criteria in 
§207.1 of the Act and its local statutory equivalent, the 
possibility that this Board would reach a different 
conclusion on the same facts is not controlling. This 
Board will not sustain a challenge to a local board's unit 
determination unless it is clear that the Act's uniting 
criteria-5-/ or some other imperative provision-6-/ have been 
disregarded. 
•^Syracuse Hancock Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, 
17 PERB J[3105 (1984). 
^/New York State Nurses Ass'n, 1 PERB ^399.93 (1968); Nassau 
County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 8 PERB J[3068 
(1975). 
^'committee of Interns and Residents, 12 PERB 5(3 012 (1979) . 
4/ln re George Lessler, 13 PERB ^3023 (1980). 
•^-/committee of Interns and Residents, supra note 3. 
^/Syracuse Hancock Professional Fire Fighters Ass'n, supra 
note 1. (statutory coverage) 
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The local board determined that the shared law 
enforcement community of interest between the correction 
officers and deputy sheriffs was insufficient to warrant 
fragmentation of CSEA's long-standing, county-wide unit. 
There being no evidence that their separate community of 
interest had produced any conflict in negotiations or caused 
CSEA to represent them inadequately, the local board 
concluded that the continuation of the existing unit was most 
appropriate. In reaching this conclusion, the local board 
fully considered the statutory criteria. It is 
inconsequential, therefore, that we may have placed a greater-
emphasis on a recognized law enforcement community of 
interest because the employer is neutral in its unit 
preference and the department head is in favor of a separate 
unit. The applicable review standard permits the local board 
to make its own "best judgment within the guidelines set 
forth in the statute. 
..7/ 
Although, as alleged, this board has granted separate 
units as of right to deputy sheriff personnel in several 
cases,£/ those decisions were rendered in materially 
different circumstances. In each case, the sheriff was an 
elected official and a joint employer with the county. The 
•2/New York State Nurses Ass'n, supra note 2, at 3247. 
8/ See, e.g., Orange County and the Sheriff of the County of 
Orange, 14 PERB [^3012 (1981) ; County of Schenectady and 
Sheriff, 14 PERB 53013 (1981) ; County of Clinton and Sheriff 
of County of Clinton, 18 PERB 53070 (1985) . 
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nature of the joint employer relationship between an elected 
sheriff and a county^/ makes satisfaction of the uniting 
criterion in §207.1(b) of the Act possible only on consent. 
When that necessary consent is withdrawn by either the county 
or the sheriff, there is no single officiai at the- levei of 
the unit with the power to agree to terms and conditions of 
employment. Because the public employers could terminate the 
unit on petition filed during the applicable open period, 
equity considerations require permitting fragmentation of the 
mixed unit on the request of the employees or their 
representative. 
The local hearing officer considered our joint employer 
decisions and found them inapplicable because the Nassau 
County Sheriff, as an appointee of the county executive, is 
not a joint employer with the County. We have never held an 
appointed sheriff to be a joint employer with a county as a 
matter of law and there are no facts offered to establish 
that status in this particular case.^0/ 
Inasmuch as the applicable and necessary criteria were 
recognized and considered by the local board, we find that 
^/compare other joint employer relationships which we have 
held do not necessarily compel fragmentation on request of a 
party to the multi-employer unit. Town of North Castle, 
19 PERB f3025 (1986). 
i^/we express no opinion as to whether a joint employer 
relationship which is dependent on the facts of the 
particular case, as opposed to the sheriff's status alone, is 
sufficient to trigger the Orange, Schenectady and Clinton 
rationale. 
Board 1-0036 
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the provisions and procedures enacted by Nassau County have 
been implemented by the local board in a manner substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in the 
Act and the Rules of Procedure of this Board. 
•^ vWOWv-•"T-HE•RE-F-0REv••-•WE•^ 0RDER•-•th•a•t.•-the-••pet•i-t•i•o•n be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IAC&4A*~ £ • 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
#2C-5/25/8? 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HAROLD E. ALSTON, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9032 
TRANSPORTATION WORKERS UNION, 
LOCAL 100, 
Respondent. 
HAROLD E. ALSTON, pro se 
O'DONNELL & SCHWARTZ, ESQS. (MANLIO DI PRETA, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Harold E. Alston excepts to the dismissal, after 
hearing, of his charge that the Transportation Workers Union, 
Local 100 (TWU) breached its duty of fair representation to 
him in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), in connection with its handling of 
certain disciplinary and contract grievance matters. 
A hearing was conducted in this matter pursuant to our 
order of remand-^/ wherein we directed that further 
proceedings be held on the specific and limited issue of 
whether the actions of the TWU in relation to Alston's 
grievances, which were found to be within the scope of its 
•1/21 PERB ^3034 (1988) . 
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authority, were, nevertheless, motivated improperly by 
Alston's dissident views. 
On remand, the assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
conducted two days of hearing, at which Alston presented 
documentary evidence and testimony oh his own behalf • At the 
conclusion of his case, the TWU moved for dismissal of the 
charge upon the ground that Alston had not met his burden of 
proof in establishing a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
By decision dated January 3, 1989, the ALJ granted the TWU's 
motion and dismissed the charge in its entirety. 
2/ 
Alston, in his exceptions to this Board, sets forth in 
great detail the events preceding the filing of his charge, 
and claims that improper motivation has been established in 
this case by use of comparative evidence of his case with 
other similar cases. However, he points to no record 
evidence which would support the allegation that he was 
subjected to disparate treatment in the handling of his 
grievances by the TWU, which was improperly motivated by his 
previous criticisms of the TWU, or by any other conduct on 
his part protected by the Act. 
1/ 
In view of the failure to establish, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the TWU's manner of handling Alston's 
^ 2 2 PERB f4502 (1989). 
3/ 
See Chenango Valley Teachers Ass'n, NYSUT, 21 PERB J[3005 
(1988) ; Hauppauge Schools Office Staff Ass'n, 18 PERB [^3029 
(1985) . 
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grievances was improperly motivated, we find that the ALJ 
properly dismissed the charge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
(AA^AAA^^ X * £u 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member Irr 
#2Dr-5/25/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF MUNICIPAL 
EMPLOYEES 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10174 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT M. ZISKIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
E. THOMAS BOYLE, ESQ. (HARRIET A. GILLIAM, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees 
(Association) excepts to the dismissal of its improper practice 
charge against the County of Suffolk (County), which alleges that 
the County violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the County Executive issued an Order 
relating to use of County vehicles, allegedly in breach of a 1973 
agreement between the parties settling a contract grievance on 
behalf of enumerated employees. 
The charge alleges, on behalf of those employees covered by 
the contract grievance settlement, that the County violated the 
settlement agreement which required the provision of motor 
vehicles for the employees for transportation in the performance 
of their duties and to and from their homes. The charge further 
Board - U-10174 
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alleges that on or about February 10, 1988, an Executive Order 
was issued, which provides, in relevant part: 
1. There shall be a general rule that cars may 
only be assigned to elected officials, 
department heads and deputy county 
executives; 
2.,.All -other- Gounty officers-and employees shall 
have access only to pool cars; 
3. In appropriate instances, pool cars may be used 
for commuting, but during the work day, these 
cars shall remain part of the pool; . . . 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded, based 
upon his review of the improper practice charge, the 1973 
settlement agreement, and the Executive Order, and upon a finding 
that the Association had grieved the County's action, that the 
charge seeks nothing more than enforcement of an agreement 
previously reached between the parties, which the County is 
alleged to have breached by issuance of its Executive Order. 
We concur with the finding of the ALJ that the charge claims 
only that the County has breached its 1973 agreement involving 
the covered bargaining unit members. The charge, for example, 
alleges that "by virtue of Executive Order #2 . . . the County of 
Suffolk . . . unilaterally terminated its aforementioned 
agreement and unilaterally limited the assignment of County 
vehicles to elected officials, department heads and deputy county 
executives, and designated all remaining vehicles as 'pool cars' 
and directed that the ten named individuals herein shall have 
access only to pool vehicles." The charge further alleges that 
"the unilateral decision to discontinue providing County vehicles 
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to the aforementioned employees constitutes a violation of 
§2 09-a.l(d) . . . ." Finally, the charge's allegations relate to 
the provision of vehicles to specified employees only, and not to 
any other procedures or policies contained in the County's 
Executive Order not covered by the agreement. From the 
foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that the charge seeks 
nothing more than enforcement of an agreement between the 
parties, which, pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act, is beyond our 
statutory authority. 1/ 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that under our 
decision in Herkimer County BOCES, 20 PERB 53050 (1987), 
conditional dismissal of the charge should have been ordered. In 
order for the conditional dismissal called for in Herkimer County 
BOCES to apply, however, the charge must set forth at least a 
colorable claim of violation of the Act separate and apart from 
any possible contract violation. Indeed, in that case, a bona 
fide dispute existed between the parties concerning whether the 
contract covered at all the issue raised by the improper practice 
charge. In order for conditional dismissal to take place, some 
basis must exist for asserting that the improper practice charge 
i/section 205.5(d) of the Act provides, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
[T]he board shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction 
over an alleged violation of such an agreement that 
would not otherwise constitute an improper employer 
or employee organization practice. 
Board - U-10174 
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extends beyond the four corners of any contract grievance which 
has been filed. In the instant case, neither the charge nor any 
clarification thereof, nor the exceptions submitted to this 
Board, raises an issue of fact concerning whether we may have 
jurisdiction over the charge in compliance with §205.5(d) of the 
Act. Because no basis is set forth by the charging party to 
establish the existence of an issue concerning our jurisdiction, 
unconditional dismissal of the charge is required. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ut*4A&*Z'„ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2E-5/25/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
- BINGHAMTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT 6157, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10181 
BINGHAMTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (EILEEN J. MC CARTHY, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
COUGHLIN & GERHART, ESQS. (FRANK W. MILLER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Binghamton City School District (District) to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which held that the 
District violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it placed two 
letters in the personnel file of Michael Igo, Unit President 
of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. - Binghamton 
City School District Unit 6157 (CSEA). 
The record establishes that during a conversation in an 
employee lounge between Igo and two unit members on 
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January 21, 1988, Igo stated that if he had access to certain 
documents he would be able to prove that Wynnyk, Director of 
Transportation and Attendance, had lied at a recent 
District/CSEA arbitration hearing. Upon learning of this 
statement, Price, the Director of Personnel issued a 
memorandum to Igo, stating the following: 
I have advised you verbally on other 
occasions that you have no right to make 
public comments about people in a manner 
which could be found to be slanderous. 
Statements of this kind are not only 
injurious to the reputation of the people 
accused but are also damaging to the 
moral [sic] and working environment of 
this School District. This is your final 
written warning that actions and 
statements of this nature are not to 
occur. 
This letter shall become a part of your 
permanent file. It should further be 
noted that this letter does not preclude 
other forms of disciplinary action in 
light of this or other events which have 
occurred recently. 
By memorandum dated February 8, 1988, Igo responded to 
the memorandum, asserting that: 
Your letter of January 28, 1988 is an 
inaccurate account as to the facts of 
January 21, 1988. 
I am requesting that the January 28, 1988 
letter not become part of my permanent 
personnel file. 
If the January 28, 1988 letter remains in 
my permanent personnel file as of 
Tuesday, February 16, 1988, an improper 
practice charge will be filed with the 
Public Employment Relations Board. 
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On February 19, 1988, Price responded to Igo's 
memorandum by issuing a further memorandum denying Igo's 
request that her prior memorandum be removed from his 
personnel file, and stating: 
It is inappropriate for an employee to 
make a~-threat" such as that contained ±n 
your letter of February 8, 1988. If you 
feel that you have a legitimate claim, 
you[r] avenue is to file what proceedings 
you feel may be appropriate. 
Please be advised that a copy of your 
February 8, 1988 correspondence along 
with a copy of this letter are being 
placed in your permanent personnel file. 
The ALT found that discussions between the president of 
an employee organization and unit members concerning events 
which affect terms and conditions of employment are protected 
by the Act. We agree that, as a general rule, such 
discussions are protected activities. Dissemination of 
information by a unit president to bargaining unit employees 
concerning testimony and events at an arbitration hearing 
conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is 
properly considered protected activity. To the extent that 
the District argues before us that Igo was not engaged in 
union activity subject to the Act's protection when he 
discussed the arbitration hearing with unit members, its 
exceptions are accordingly denied. 
The more difficult issue before us is whether Igo's 
statement that Wynnyk lied during the hearing is beyond the 
realm of protected activity. 
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We have previously held-i/ that "an employee engaged in a 
protected activity does not lose that protection merely 
because he makes inaccurate statements that disturb the 
employer. The employee retains his protection unless his 
statements are shown to indicate an 'intent to falsify or 
maliciously injure the respondent.1" 
While the District asserts that Igo's statement is 
slanderous, false and malicious, the record discloses neither 
that the statement was false, nor that it was made with an 
intent to falsify or maliciously to injure the District. 
2/ 
Because Igo was engaged in protected activity at the time he 
made his statement, the burden shifted to the District to 
establish that the nature of the statement was such as to 
take it outside the scope of the Act's protection. In order 
to meet this burden, it would have had to establish that Igo 
intentionally made a false statement, or maliciously sought 
to injure the District by making the statement.-2/ Because no 
evidence whatsoever was introduced to establish Igo's intent 
Vpiainedcre Public Schools, 13 PERB ^[3037, at 3056 (1980), 
citing Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 753, 53 LRRM 2428 
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert, denied, 375 U.S. 923, 54 LRRM 2576 
(1963). 
•^The entire record consists of the three memoranda quoted 
supra, together with certain correspondence, none of which 
relates to these issues. 
3/see O'Neil v. Peekskill Faculty Assn., 120 A.D.2d 36 (2d 
Dep't 1986), motion for leave to appeal denied, 69 N.Y.2d 984 
(1987). 
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or motive, or his belief in the truth of the statement, the 
statement is within the realm of protected activity. 
Having so found, we affirm the finding of the ALT that 
the District violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act when it 
issued a "final written warning" to Igo for his conduct of 
January 21, 1988. 
We further affirm the finding of the AKJ that Igo's 
assertion in his February 8, 1988 memorandum that failure to 
remove Price's earlier writing would result in the filing of 
an improper practice charge with the Public Employment 
Relations Board is also protected activity. A single 
assertion of the intention to file an improper practice 
charge does not constitute a threat which would take the 
assertion outside the realm of protected activity. 
Therefore, the placement of Igo's and Price's memorandum of 
February 19 into Igo's permanent personnel file are likewise 
violative of these two subsections of the Act because, as we 
earlier held in Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York (Barnett), 17 PERB H3 046, at 
3073 (1984), the filing "is likely to have a chilling effect 
upon the employee's exercise of [protected] activities." 
Based upon the foregoing, the District's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ decision is affirmed in its entirety. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the District: 
1. Remove from Igo's personnel file the letters dated 
January 28, 1988, February 8, 1988, and 
February 19, 1988; 
2. Cease and desist from restraining, coercing, 
interfering with or discriminating against Michael 
Igo or any other unit member for engaging in the 
exercise of activities protected by the Act; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit members. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^L^ir-7c/\A^L^ 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member / 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLO 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
...,._ PUBLIC^EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. - Binghamton City School 
District Unit 6157, that the Binghamton City School District will: 
1„ Remove from Michael Igo's personnel file the letters 
dated January 28, 1988, February 8, 1988 and 
February 19, 1988. 
) 
! ) 2, Not restrain, coerce, interfere with or discriminate 
against Michael Igo or any other unit member for 
engaging in the exercise of activities protected by 
the Act, 
Binghamton City School District 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#3A-5/25/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
.--.••-.;:••----.•.--.•-.-.:;-...:•..- Petitioner, -. 
-and- CASE NO. C-3509 
TOWN OF CHARLESTON, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3509 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time mechanical equipment operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters>AFL-eiO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 25, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
